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ORIGINAL MEANING AND
THE DEATH PENALTY
BY JOHN STINNEFORD1
Thank you so much for having me here today and thank you, Ms. Bishop,
for that talk; that was really wonderful and inspiring.2 I started my career as
a visiting professor here at St. Thomas. Those were two of the best years of
my life. It is not an overstatement to say that your faculty here taught me
how to be a teacher and a scholar, and a person of faith as well, in many
ways. It is a wonderful homecoming to be back here.
I would also like to share my own personal convictions before I move on to
constitutional law, which is what I am going to talk about today. I am
personally against the death penalty. I think it is a profound tragedy that it
still exists, particularly because of the risk of executing the innocent. There
is no way to eliminate this risk. I was a federal prosecutor myself for a
while and at one point I discovered that we had charged an innocent person
in a bank robbery case. Federal prosecutors have relatively small caseloads
compared to state’s attorneys, and lots of resources, and yet the only reason
we found out before conviction that this person was innocent was pure
accident – pure luck. If that is happening in the federal system, it is
certainly happening in all the state systems. I do not think there is any way
to eradicate it.
But I am going to talk today about a different question: Whether the death
penalty is constitutional. The main thing that I write about, and think about,
is the original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.3
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Today, I am going to look at the constitutionality of the death penalty from
the perspective of original meaning. I do not think the death penalty itself is
cruel and unusual within the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment,
although certain applications of it certainly are.4 If the court paid closer
attention to the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, we would
probably limit much of what we do.
Let me start by talking a little about what has happened in recent years –
really since the early 2000s – with respect to the death penalty. In some
ways, the Court has reached out to limit the scope of the death penalty. In
recent decades, it has declared the death penalty to be cruel and unusual for
mentally disabled offenders,5 for juvenile offenders,6 and for anyone
convicted of a non-homicide offense against an individual.7 At the same
time, the Court has twice upheld the constitutionality of lethal injection as a
manner of execution.8 I am going argue today that some of the Court’s
decisions limiting the death penalty may (or may not) be defensible from
the perspective of original meaning. The decisions upholding lethal
injection, on the other hand, are probably incorrect. Lethal injection is
probably an unconstitutional method of punishment. The reasons it is
unconstitutional shed a lot of light on what is wrong with our criminal
justice system generally, so I will be talking about that in a little while.
Let me start by noting the difficulty of the problem that any court faces in
deciding whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. The very purpose of
punishment is to inflict pain. We are inflicting physical pain and
psychological pain in retaliation for wrongdoing; that is what punishment
is.
To decide that something is cruel and unusual, you have to figure out what
the line is between constitutionally acceptable pain and unconstitutionally
cruel pain. How do we draw that line? It is an extraordinarily difficult line
to draw once you think about it as a legal matter. The court has adopted two
diametrically opposite ways of trying to answer this problem. When Justice
Scalia was alive, he represented an “originalist” perspective. He basically
said, “If a punishment was okay in 1790, it must be okay today; that is how
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we figure out whether something is cruel and unusual.”9 Simply look at
what they did in 1790, and if they did it then, they can do it today. He also
took the position that there is no proportionality principle under the Eighth
Amendment.10 That is to say, if a method of punishment was used for any
crime in 1790, it can be used for an entirely different crime today. For
example, if life imprisonment was available for murder in 1790, then we
can use it today for shoplifting. He argued that courts should not ask
whether a punishment is disproportionate to a given crime, but only
whether the punishment is inherently cruel or barbaric.
The majority, on the other hand, has taken an explicitly non-originalist
approach to the problem. They suggest the Eighth Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that marked the
progress of a maturing society.11 The idea here is that every day and in
every way society is getting kinder and gentler, and as society gets kinder
and gentler, so too does the Eighth Amendment. We are not bound to the
standards of 1790; we are bound instead to the standards of today.12
Now, notice that Justice Scalia’s “originalist” standard and the majority’s
non-originalist standard are mirror images of each other, because each asks
the Court to take a snapshot of public opinion at a given moment in time.13
Justice Scalia says the Court should take a snapshot of 1790; the majority
says the Court should take a snapshot of today. I am going to argue that
both of these methods of interpreting the Eighth Amendment are incorrect
as a matter of original meaning. In fact, the second one does not even
pretend to be correct.14 They are also unworkable. They do not really work
in practice, and that is one of the reasons why the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause is so very weak today as a protection for criminal
offenders.15
What are the problems with each of these approaches? The problem with
Justice Scalia's standard is that in 1790, punishments such as whipping,
bodily mutilation, and the pillory were considered acceptable forms of
punishment. Justice Scalia himself, shortly after he got on the Supreme
Court, gave a famous talk at the University of Cincinnati law school, where
he called himself a “faint-hearted originalist.”16 He said:
John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to
Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1766 (2008)
10
Id. at 1758 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991)).
11
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
12
Id.
13
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U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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What if some state should enact a new law providing public
lashing, or branding of the right hand, as punishment for certain
criminal offenses? Even if it could be demonstrated unequivocally
that these were not cruel and unusual measures in 1791, and even
though no prior Supreme Court decision has specifically
disapproved them, I doubt whether any federal judge-even among
the many who consider themselves originalists-would sustain them
against an [E]ighth [A]mendment challenge…I hasten to confess
that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot
imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a
statute that imposes the punishment of flogging.17
Now, later in his career, he became less faint-hearted. He said,
“[W]hat I would say now is, yes, if a state enacted a law permitting
flogging, it is immensely stupid, but it is not unconstitutional.”18 Despite
Justice Scalia’s change of heart later in life, the fact that he himself would
have trouble upholding his own standard in practice indicates that it may
not be a very workable standard, may not be a very good standard.
What is the problem with the evolving standard of decency test? There are
all sorts of problems with it. I am going to walk through some of them now.
The first is the “Who decides?” problem. How do we figure out what
current standards of decency are? Should the Court look to juries and
legislatures? This might make sense because the jury is a cross section of
the people, and the legislature is elected to represent the people. The Court
has never limited itself to those two sources of information, however.
Sometimes it looks to international opinion, sometimes to the opinions of
professional associations, and sometimes to public opinion polls.19 Justices
Brennan and Marshall famously looked to hypothetical public opinion –
what would the public think if they only knew as much as we Supreme
Court justices know?20 So, it is hard to say what our sources of information
about current standards of decency are. This is a particular problem, if you
think about it, because anytime a death penalty case gets up to the Supreme
Court, the punishment has been authorized by at least one legislature and
imposed by at least one jury. Often, it has been authorized by many
legislators and imposed by many juries.

17

Id. at 861.
See Marcia Coyle, The Roberts Court: The Struggle for the Constitution 165 (1st ed. 2013);
Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Justice Scalia, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 14, 2013, at 24.
19
Stinneford, supra note 8, at 1751.
20
Id.
18
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So, if the court were serious about relying on current societal attitudes, it
would almost never strike down the death penalty or any other punishment,
because the punishment has been authorized by the people and that is what
the test is supposed to measure.
A second problem with this standard is that it ties in the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment to current public opinion. Public opinion and individual
rights are not like chocolate and peanut butter; they are not two great tastes
that taste great together.21 They are more like oil and water; they should
never mix. The reason we have a bill of rights is to protect unpopular
people from public opinion when public opinion turns against them. It is
hard to imagine a more unpopular group of people than criminal offenders,
especially in death penalty cases.
The notion that the Eighth Amendment only protects criminal offenders
when public opinion supports such protection is a perverse idea, and again,
it is based on a very naïve and incorrect view of public opinion. As I said
earlier, the evolving standards of decency test is based on the assumption
that we are actually getting kinder and gentler over time as a society. That
is not necessarily true. Sometimes we get kinder and gentler, but sometimes
we get much harsher. In fact, anyone who has lived in the last forty years
knows that we have had a series of public panics about crime in this
country. In the 60s and 70s, it was crime rates generally. In the 80s, it was
drug crime. In the 90s, it was juvenile super-predators. Today, it is sex
offenders. Every time there is a public panic about a group of offenders,
what do the legislatures do? They ratchet up the harshness of punishment to
new and unprecedented levels.
Now, if the Court were to take the evolving standards of decency test
seriously, the Court would have to approve all of the new cruelty – all the
new harshness – because it is strongly supported by public opinion. It is a
very problematic standard from that perspective, right? It is important to
think about this when we think of ourselves as being so much better, and
more advanced, than people were at the end of the 18th century, for
example, because we do not use the pillory and that sort of thing.
But look at where we are. In 1970, there were 300,000 incarcerated people
in this country, and today there are 2.25 million.22 Now if you look at just
population growth, you would expect that 300,000 to become maybe
600,000 by today. Instead, we have 2.25 million. We incarcerate more

21

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2016, Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ 251149 (Jan. 2018),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf.
22

Original Meaning and the Death Penalty

49

people in this country than any other country in the history of the world, so
are we kinder and gentler? I think that is open to question.
The result of the Court’s adoption of the evolving standards of decency test
has been an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that is both narrow and
unprincipled.23 It is unprincipled especially in its treatment of the death
penalty. That is to say, the Court has reached out to limit the death penalty
in a number of areas, but it had to do so by pretending to find a consensus
against the punishment when no such consensus exists. For example, let's
take the death penalty for non-homicide offenders. The case of Kennedy v.
Louisiana was a case involving aggravated rape of a child, and the courts
said you could not execute someone for aggravated rape of a child, despite
the fact that there was a strong legislative trend towards authorizing this
punishment.24
Take a public opinion poll on that one. How many people do you think
would be against the death penalty for those who commit aggravated rape
against young children? I doubt you would find a majority of people against
that punishment. So, the Court had to simply pretend that there is a
consensus, and it did so in other death penalty cases as well. It is bad for the
Court, bad for the Constitution, and bad for the rule of law when the Court
pretends to find a societal consensus that does not really exist so that the
Court can reach a result that it wants to reach.
On the other hand, with respect to sentences of imprisonment, the Court has
basically taken an almost completely hands-off approach. It has done some
things to protect juvenile offenders from life sentences without the
possibility of parole,25 but beyond that it has taken an almost completely
hands-off approach. At the very moment prison sentences have become
harsher than they ever were before, the Court said, “Do what you like,
legislature; we are going to defer to you.”26 Now, why did they do that?
Because again, the evolving standards of decency test would not really
help.
The Court cannot simply pretend to find a societal consensus against a
punishment in cases involving large numbers of offenders, because if the
Court’s decision resulted in large numbers of offenders being released,
based on a blatantly made up Supreme Court finding, there would be a lot
of political blowback against the Court. So, the Court simply leaves prison
alone.
23

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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The death penalty is very important, but you need to understand that even at
its height in modern times it was very, very rarely imposed, so the Court's
death penalty decisions have protected maybe one one-thousandth of one
percent of all felony offenders in this country. The other millions who come
through the criminal justice system every year are completely unprotected.
The evolving standards of decency test, in addition to being incorrect from
an originalist perspective, simply does not work very well.
You might be thinking, “Well, what do we do Stinneford? It is easy to be a
critic, right? You said that it is a hard problem. What is the solution?” I am
glad you are all sitting down because it is a shocking one. The solution is to
actually read the Constitution before you try to enforce it.
Particularly, take notice of the fact that the Eighth Amendment does not
prohibit cruel punishments, but cruel and unusual punishments and both
sides have ignored the word unusual in this debate.27 The plurality opinion
in Trop v. Dulles, the case that announced evolving standards of decency
test, said:
Whether the word “unusual” has any qualitative meaning different
from “cruel” is not clear. On the few occasions this Court has had
to consider the meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between
cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been drawn… These
cases indicate that the Court simply examines the particular
punishment involved in light of the basic prohibition against
inhuman treatment, without regard to any subtleties of meaning that
might be latent in the word “unusual.”…If the word “unusual” is to
have any meaning apart from the word “cruel,” however, the
meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something different
from that which is generally done.”28
Interestingly, Justice Scalia in Harmelin vs. Michigan – his big originalist
opinion – did the same thing.29 He asserted that it is unclear what unusual
means, and that if it means anything, it means “[s]uch as is [not] in common
use.”30 Both the originalists and the non-originalists largely ignored the
meaning of the word. This makes sense in a way, because who cares how
unusual a punishment is? It would seem that the more often you do
something cruel, the worse it is. It may be cruel to torture only the worst
sex offenders on only rare occasions. But if we were torturing every
27
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shoplifter who came through the door, that seems to be a much worse thing
to do.
So, why should we care about whether a punishment is “unusual” or not?
We should care because the word does not mean what we have all thought
it means. The word “unusual” in the Eighth Amendment does not mean rare
or uncommon; it actually means contrary to long usage.31 In other words, it
means new or innovative. When you hear “cruel and unusual,” think “cruel
and new.” The word “unusual” is a common-law term that reflects the
common law ideology underlying the Eighth Amendment and much of the
Bill of Rights.32 I need to unpack this for a little bit. So, the students
probably did not think you were going to get cold called, but let me cold
call you. Tell me, what is the common law? What you were taught in law
school that common law is? Judge-made law right? That is what I was
taught in law school. That is what most people are taught today in all their
first-year courses: judge-made law. Judges make the common law. This is
an idea that we got largely from Oliver Wendell Holmes, who announced
that the common law is simply judges making public policy from the bench
based on their idea of what is good public policy.33 But this is a lie. That is
not what the common law was thought to be prior to Holmes. Critics of the
common law claimed that judges really made law, but they made this claim
in order to delegitimize the common law, because judges do not have the
authority to make law. Contrary to the critics, common law thinkers said
that the common law was a kind of customary law – the law of custom and
long usage. Not judge-made law. So, the justification for the common law
was never that the judges have the power to make the law.
Here is the idea behind the common law: for common law thinkers, there
was the common law. It was out there, judges were using it, and they
started thinking, “Well, how could the common law be law, because the
king has never said, ‘Thou shalt or thou shalt not’?” Parliament has never
said, “Thou shalt and thou shalt not.” Yet somehow it is still law, because
the judges were applying customary rules in these cases. The idea behind
the common law became that, when a legal practice is used for a very long
time throughout the jurisdiction, this is evidence that it is reasonable and
that it enjoys the stable multi-generational consent of the people. If it did
not enjoy that, it would stop being used. So, the idea was that it was okay to
have customary law and to enforce it in court, because long usage
guarantees that it is reasonable and just and it enjoys the consent of the

31

See Stinneford, supra note 8.
Id. at 1745.
33
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, Project Gutenberg at 35, 36 (2013),
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people. That is the idea behind the common law – customary law supported
by long usage.
Now over time this developed into an idea that the common law was
normatively superior to enacted law – that is, morally superior to enacted
law. It tracks more closely to fundamental principles of justice because it
does not become law until long usage has shown it to be good, whereas
enacted law does not have the same guarantee of goodness. I think anyone
who has any familiarity with laws passed by a legislature knows this to be
true. There was that famous moment during the Obamacare debate when
Nancy Pelosi said, “We have to pass the law before we can tell what is in
it,” and everyone kind of laughed and mocked her about it, but in a way this
is true of every law.34 Even if you know what is in a law, once it gets passed
and starts getting used, it often has unintended effects that are unjust or
inconvenient.
Common law thinkers said that the common law is normatively superior to
enacted law because long usage guarantees that its effects will be just and
reasonable, whereas enacted laws enjoy no such guarantee. Now this is
important because it developed into a further idea, which is the very idea of
rights enforceable against the sovereign.35 This is where the very idea of
individual rights came from in the Anglo American system, because the
notion was, since the common law is much more just and reliable than laws
enacted by Parliament, the common law places some limits on what king or
Parliament can do.36 If they do something that undermines a fundamental
right established by the common law, then this is not real law.37 This is
beyond their true authority. This is a mere active power and not law.38
That is the idea behind individual rights: they come from the common law.
Though this idea came from England, it never fully succeeded in England.
England actually underwent a civil war between the King and Parliament
that concerned, at least in part, whether the power of the sovereign could be
constrained by the common law.39 England ultimately settled on the
absolute sovereignty of Parliament, which could not be constrained by the
common law. But in America, the idea of common law limits on sovereign
power caught on and held. The American Revolution itself was based on
See Dan MacGuill, Did Nancy Pelosi Say Obamacare Must be Passed to ‘Find Out What Is in
It’?, Snopes (Oct. 2017), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/pelosi-healthcare-pass-the-bill-tosee-what-is-in-it/.
35
Stinneford, supra note 8, at 1771-72.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Jane J. Ohlmeyer, English Civil Wars, Encyclopædia Brittanica (Nov. 2018),
https://www.britannica.com/event/English-Civil-Wars.
34
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this idea. When the sovereign tried to tax us without giving us
representation in Parliament, tried to take away the right to a jury trial, et
cetera, the refrain was, “You can't do that, because you are violating rights
established through long usage, established through common law.”
So, the idea now – I hope you are getting the idea here – is that this is our
baseline for understanding whether a given governmental action is just or
unjust. Does it violate rights established through long usage? You may say,
“That is great about the common law, but how do we know that the word
‘unusual’ means contrary to long usage?” I said “unusual” is something that
violates rights established through long usage. But how do we know that is
what the term means?
We know what “unusual” means largely because of a man named Titus
Oates. Now in 2005, Oates was voted the worst Briton of the seventeenth
century and the third-worst Briton of the past thousand years.40 He is a bad
guy, but he is actually one of my favorite people, because he helps us
understand what cruel and unusual means. Let me tell you the story of Titus
Oates.
Oates was a disreputable seventeenth century Anglican clergyman. 41 He
had fallen on hard times, he had had trouble with the law, and he started
thinking, “How can I get fame and fortune?” He was sort of a Kardashian
of his era. He wanted fame and fortune and he thought, “Well, people do
not like Catholics very much. Everyone is always worried that the Spanish
Armada is going to come sailing up the Thames. If I make up a story about
a Popish plot to kill the king and I name the conspirators, everyone will
love me because I have saved the monarchy, and I will have fame and
fortune!” So, he does that. He makes up a story about a Popish plot to kill
the king.42 He goes to a magistrate in London and gives evidence about this
plot.43 Ten days later, the magistrate turns up dead in the streets of
London.44 So, it is a panic now. Everyone is panicked – the Catholics are
coming, the Catholics are coming.45 They have a series of trials of all the
conspirators that Oates named: trial, conviction, execution; trial, conviction,
execution. One after the other until we get to the final trial, at which point
Oates’ story falls apart.46 Oates had claimed to witness a key meeting of the
‘Worst’ historical Britons list, BBC News, (Dec. 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/4561624.stm.
41
Stinneford, supra note 8, at 1760.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
40
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conspirators in England on a certain date. It turns out that Oates was
actually in France – you know, drinking some wine and eating cheese – on
that day and that the whole story had been made up.47 It all fell apart.48
Now the question was, “What do we do with Titus Oates?” If you think
about Titus Oates, he is like a serial killer, right?49 But he is worse than a
typical serial killer, because the typical serial killer has some kind of
psychological compulsion.50 But Oates just wanted fame and fortune, and
he was willing to kill innocent people to get it. So, what do we do with
Oates? The problem was that, as a legal matter, the only crime he had
committed was perjury, which was a misdemeanor.51 You cannot execute
him for perjury, so what do you do with Oates? By the way, this is all
public record; you can read the trial of Titus Oates.52 So, he gets convicted
of two counts of perjury, and at sentencing, the judges say, “Well, Mr.
Oates, this is a misdemeanor so we cannot take your life and we cannot take
your limb, but we have something special prepared for you.”53 That is close
to the actual language – “We have something special prepared for you.”
Here is what they had prepared for him.
They fined him two thousand marks, which was a very large fine.54 They
had him flogged while being dragged across the city of London from
Aldgate to Newgate, and then two days later, just as the wounds started
healing, he was once again flogged while being dragged across the city of
London from Newgate to Tyburn.55 Many people think the hope was that he
would be flogged to death, but like a cockroach in a nuclear war, he
survived.56
He was also sentenced to pillorying four times a year for life.57 You are
looking at an actual woodcarving of Oates in the pillory.58 They used to
make these woodcarvings, and they would print postcards and sell them.59
47

Stinneford, supra note 8, at 1760.
Id.
49
See Leonard G. Johns, et al., Serial Murder: Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives for Investigators,
Federal Bureau of Investigations (Robert J. Morton ed.), https://www.fbi.gov/statsservices/publications/serial-murder#two.
50
Id.
51
Stinneford, supra note 8, at 1760.
52
See, e.g., Second Trial of Titus Oates, 10 How. St. Tr. 1227, 1314 (K.B. 1685).
53
Id. (as quoted by Justice Scalia, “we have taken special care of you”).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
See John Simkin, Titus Oates, Spartacus Educational, (Aug. 2014), https://spartacuseducational.com/STUoates.htm.
59
Id.
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Oates was also sentenced to life imprisonment and he was defrocked.60 That
was the punishment inflicted on Titus Oates. Now, this all happened in
1685, under Charles II.61 Charles II died a few years later.62 He was
succeeded by his brother, James II, who was a Catholic.63 People did not
like him very much, and they eventually ran him out of town. They invited
William and Mary to come over and become the new king and queen of
England.64 Parliament said to William and Mary, “We would like you to be
our new sovereign, but before you come, we have come up with this thing
called ‘the Bill of Rights.’ We would like you to sign it, and if you sign the
Bill of Rights, we will make you king and queen.”65 Of course, William and
Mary were already measuring the drapery at Windsor Palace, and so they
were like, “Sure!” They signed it and it became law, and who showed up in
Parliament the very next year but Titus Oates.66
Again, you can read all of this. You can read the parliamentary debates
about this.67 Oates showed up he said, “Hey, good job on that Bill of
Rights. By the way, I noticed that it prohibits cruel and unusual
punishments. It just so happens that the punishment inflicted on me was
cruel and unusual. Will you please suspend the judgment?” There was a big
debate about it in Parliament, and if you read the debates, it is very clear
that a majority in Parliament believed that his punishment was cruel and
unusual.68 In fact, members of the House of Commons said that they were
thinking specifically of Oates when they wrote the cruel and unusual
punishments clause that appeared in the English Bill of Rights initially.69
Most importantly, they gave the reasons they believed Oates’s punishment
was cruel and unusual: They said it was “contrary to law and ancient
practice,” it was without precedent, and it would create a bad precedent for
the future.70 It was unprecedented, contrary to ancient practice, and
therefore cruel and unusual.
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Parliament did not suspend the judgment against Oates because the House
of Lords just hated him so much, they could not do it.71 There is an actual
quote where they say “[s]o ill a man” should not get the benefit of the Bill
of Rights.72 But even though Oates lost, the debate over Oate’s punishment
shows what it means for a punishment to be cruel and unusual: It must be
unjustly harsh in light of longstanding prior practice. By the way, Titus
Oates’s case contradicts Justice Scalia's claim that a punishment has to
involve an inherently cruel or barbaric method of punishment to be cruel
and unusual. All of the punishments inflicted on Oates except defrocking
were acceptable under the common law at the time.73 Even if you added
them all up together, the absolute level of harshness was not as great as
some punishments that were inflicted for other crimes at the time. For
example, for treason you could get drawn and quartered, which is very,
very gruesome and painful.74 Compared to drawing and quartering, Oates’s
punishment could not be considered inherently cruel or barbaric. It is clear
that if Oates’ punishment was cruel and unusual, it was because it was
disproportionate to the crime of perjury. It was unprecedented as a
punishment for this sort of offense. So, in England, clearly proportionality
was part of the analysis.
Now you might be thinking, “Well okay, that is fine, but that is England.
Didn’t we have a revolution to get away from them? Why should we think
that the cruel and unusual punishments clause in the Eighth Amendment
means the same thing that it did in England?” In fact, there is a lot of
evidence of this. I have written an article about it – if you have trouble
sleeping, it is a great sleep aid.75 Both in the run up to the revolution and
also during the debate over the Constitution, Americans regularly use the
word “unusual” to mean contrary to the common law, unprecedented, or
innovative.76 For example, the Virginia House of Burgesses sent a letter to
the King of England complaining that British efforts to deny Americans the
right to a jury trial were “unusual” – meaning new, unprecedented.77
Similarly, in the debate over the Constitution, the framers associated
innovation in punishment with the adoption of the civil law practices of
Europe.78 They worried that if Congress was not bound to follow the
common law, it might decide to follow the example of the Spanish
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Inquisition and impose torture, which is prohibited by the common law.
The cruel and unusual punishments clause was designed to prevent that
from happening. Patrick Henry famously criticized the entire federal
government as a series of “new and unusual experiments.”79
It is quite clear historically that the Eighth Amendment was meant to serve
as a check on Congress’s ability to deviate from the common law tradition.
We do not want government innovating punishment in a way that is
significantly harsher than prior punishment practice would permit. What
does this mean? I told you Justice Scalia said we should look at a snapshot
of 1790 to figure out whether a punishment is permissible. The evolving
standards of decency test asks us to look at snapshot of current practice.80
The actual original meaning asks us to look at longstanding prior practice –
that is, it directs us to ask what the tradition has been up to today and how
this new punishment we are trying to impose compares to the punishments
that have traditionally been imposed for a given crime.
What would the effect of adopting this standard be on current Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, and in particular the death penalty?
First of all, the original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause precisely reverses the evolving standards of decency test. Instead of
asking “Does this traditional punishment still meet our current standards of
decency?” the courts should be asking, “Does this new punishment meet
our traditional standards of decency?” That is the idea. Underlying this is
the idea that we most need to worry about cruelty when there is some kind
of public panic that has driven the government to feel that it needs to get
tough on crime, to show that it is in control. That is when we are most
likely to see cruel punishment and that is when we need courts to intervene
to prevent it from happening. That is the basic idea behind the original
meaning of the clause.81
Second, this standard is distinct from Justice Scalia's standard, because the
common law incorporates a doctrine called “desuetude,” which says that if
a practice falls out of usage for a significant period of time, then it is
considered to be no longer part of our tradition.82 The idea is it has not
survived the test of time and therefore, if you introduce it now, it is just like
introducing new punishment. The mere fact that we mutilated people in
1790 does not mean we can do so today, and the mere fact that we executed
79
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people for crimes like counterfeiting in 1790 does not mean we can do so
today. These punishments fell out of usage long ago. They are no longer
part of the tradition. If you bring them back, you should not compare them
to the practices of 1790, but to the tradition as if it has survived up to today.
Third, as I noted earlier, it is quite clear that the clause incorporates a
proportionality principle. I did not talk much about the American side of
that today, but I have written a whole article on the topic so if you are
interested, you can read it.83 Disproportionate punishments are a form of
cruel and unusual punishment.84
Now, what does this say to us about the death penalty? It says several
things, I think. First of all, to the extent the death penalty has survived
continuously over time, it cannot plausibly be characterized as cruel and
unusual. It is not new or innovative, and thus does not come within the
prohibition of the Eighth Amendment.
Several once-traditional applications of the death penalty may now be cruel
and unusual, however. For example, it is probably unconstitutional to
execute someone for counterfeiting, even though this punishment was
inflicted for this crime in the 1790s, because this application of the death
penalty did not survive the test of time.
Also, many state constitutions have their own cruel and unusual
punishments clauses.85 Usage is jurisdiction specific, so if a given
jurisdiction eliminated the death penalty a long time ago, and then tried to
bring it back, you might be able to say, “Well, this is cruel and unusual
under the constitution of this state, because this is not a part of our state’s
tradition – even though it may not be cruel and unusual as a federal matter.”
This is one area where many state constitutions may be more protective
than the federal constitution.
The final point I want to make has to do with methods of punishment, using
lethal injection as an example. Lethal injection is, in many ways, a window
into American punishment practices generally. The public perception of
lethal injection is that it is just like putting an animal to sleep: You give the
offender an injection, they to go to sleep and never wake up. That is the
public perception of lethal injection. But this is not how it actually works.
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Lethal injection typically involves a three-drug cocktail.86 One of those
drugs, until recently, has been a barbiturate. If you give someone a massive
overdose of barbiturates, he will go to sleep and never wake up. That is how
animals are euthanized. But lethal injection does not involve just
barbiturates, it also involves a heart stopping agent and a paralyzing agent.87
Let us talk for a minute about why lethal injection involves all three drugs.
To get there, I think we need to talk a little bit about the history of the
methods of execution in this country. Traditionally – if you look at the
nineteenth century, for example – executions were often performed by
methods such as hanging or the firing squad. These were methods that, if
done properly, would kill someone quite quickly, and I believe relatively
painlessly, but they were gruesome. They were public in the nineteenth
century.88 Every now and then, there would be a botched execution and
people watching the execution would be really angered and repulsed by
what they saw. There are occasions in the nineteenth century where people
would try to lynch the executioner when the executioner would botch an
execution.89 So, how did the state respond to this? First, the state moved
executions into the prison yard and then, finally, inside the prison.90
Now, the reason that has been given publicly, and what you may have all
been told, is that this was done to prevent the coarsening of public
opinion.91 We do not want people to enjoy watching someone die. Maybe
that is part of it, but I do not think it was the driving reason. I think the
driving reason for making executions private was to eliminate public
revulsion against executions. If you just read about an execution, you are
not going to get especially upset. You are much less likely to be angry even
to read about a botched execution.
Then what did we do? We adopted different methods of execution, each of
which was supposed to be more scientific and less cruel than the ones that
came before.92 We went to electrocution when electricity was new.93 It was
supposed to be painless, but it turns out that it was not. It was gruesome and
often painful. There were also more botched electric chair executions than
86
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there had been for hangings.94 Over time, it became clear that this was
problematic, so we switched to the gas chamber.95 The gas chamber, too,
was supposed to be painless, but actually often caused a gruesome death. It
also took a long time – sometimes fifteen minutes or more – for a person to
asphyxiate in a gas chamber.96 Then we finally came up, in the 1970s, with
lethal injection.97
Why the three-drug cocktail? The problem with barbiturates was that they
took too long. It could take forty-five minutes or an hour for someone to
die.98 The state thought, “We need to be able to speed up the process, we
need it to happen fast.” So, the barbiturates were combined with a heartstopping agent, was supposed to kill the offender quickly.99 But there are
two problems with the heart-stopping agent. One is that if you are not fully
unconscious, it is an extraordinarily painful way to die. It is like being
burned to death from the inside, like having battery acid poured into your
veins. Now, barbiturates are supposed to take care of that. You are
supposed to be asleep. But if you do not have enough barbiturates, or they
are not properly administered, you are going to feel excruciating pain. The
other problem with the heart-stopping agent is that it causes convulsions.
Even if the offender is fully unconscious, he or she will flip around on the
table and would appear to be in a lot of pain.100 The state did not want that.
They wanted it to look like the offender is going to sleep. So, they also give
the offender a paralyzing agent.101 The paralyzing agent makes sure you do
not move at all.
Now, there are two problems with a paralyzing agent. One of those
problems is that if the barbiturates are not properly administered, then death
by paralyzing agent is also extremely painful, because it is like being
asphyxiated. Your lungs stop working, but your brain keeps working, so
you feel as though you are drowning.102 Now imagine drowning and being
burned to death from the inside at the same time. That is what it is like if
you are not fully unconscious. The barbiturate is supposed to solve that
problem, but of course there is the risk that it might not be properly
administered. You might not be fully unconscious. Of course, because of
the paralyzing agent, so if you are conscious and you are feeling every bit
of it, we do not know because you have been paralyzed. You cannot
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register any physical reaction to the pain you are experiencing. This is the
problem now.
Lethal injection is also an extraordinarily complex procedure. It involves
three different drugs, and proper administration requires skill and expertise.
Generally speaking, doctors do not want to be involved, so the procedure is
performed by prison officials. The states also often compartmentalize the
process so that there is nine or ten different people involved in different
stages of the process so no one feels too responsible for the death. But there
can be a mistake during any one of those stages, and the
compartmentalization makes the mistake harder to discover.103And so, what
you end up having is a great risk of a botched execution.
There is a recent study showing that lethal injections are botched at more
than twice the rate of hangings, for example – more than twice the rate.104
This is just the botched executions that we know of. If lethal injection is
botched, remember, the offender is tortured to death. This is what we are
doing with respect to lethal injection.
In short, lethal injection appears to meet the criteria for a cruel and unusual
punishment under the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment.105 It is a
new method of punishment and is significantly harsher than traditional
methods like hanging. Now, you might ask yourself, “Why are we doing it
this way? Why are we using a three-drug cocktail?” I think the answer is
aesthetics. We are doing it so that we can feel better about ourselves as a
society, and the state can minimize public reactions against the death
penalty. If you can hide from public view the fact that you are violently
killing someone – and that is what we do every time we execute someone –
then the public will not react against the death penalty. Now, we have
moved executions out of the public square, inside the prison yard, inside the
prison, and even inside the prison where we are using drugs to hide the
nature of what we do to make it look better – more antiseptic so that there is
no public reaction against the death penalty.
I think this is the big problem, because under the original meaning of the
Eighth Amendment, the idea is that over the long term you can rely on
public opinion to eliminate cruel methods of punishment. That is the
supposition underlying the clause, but of course public opinion can only be
relied upon to eliminate cruel punishments if the public knows what is
happening. The public should have some basis of assessing whether
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something is cruel and unusual or not. Currently, the public does not have
that basis because the state does everything it can to hide executions from
public view.
This is my final point. In a way, lethal injection is a microcosm of the entire
criminal punishment system in this country. Starting in the beginning of the
nineteenth century, we moved from largely public punishments – think of
Titus Oates in the pillory – to private punishments, where we take you and
we put you in a prison cell. That seems nicer. Less degrading and less
humiliating. But once you are inside the prison cell, we cannot see you. We
cannot see the suffering that you are undergoing. So, the legislature says,
“Hey, let's change the punishment for burglary from two years in jail to five
years, to ten years, to twenty years.” The public can rarely see the increased
harshness, the increased pain, increased suffering, and the increased cruelty
of that punishment. I think that is one of the reasons that it was so easy over
the last forty years to ratchet up the harshness of punishment, to the point
where we now incarcerate more people than ever before, because the public
just cannot see it.
That is a significant problem. I do not know the solution to it. I think the
work of the Innocence Project, and the work that Ms. Bishop is doing, has
been extremely effective in reducing the death penalty, at least in some
states. But I think if we want to be truly effective in showing the public
what is cruel about our system and what needs to be changed, we need to
find a way to let the public see it.
Thank you very much.

